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Abstract
I introduce an optimizing monopolistic market maker in an other-
wise standard setting a` la Brock and Hommes (1998) (BH98). The
market maker sets the price of a zero yielding asset taking advantage
of her knowledge of speculators’ demand, manages her inventory of
the asset and eventually earns profits from trading. The resulting dy-
namic behavior is qualitatively identical to the one described in BH98,
showing that the results of the latter are independent from the insti-
tutional framework of the market. At the same time I show that the
market maker has conflicting effects. She acts as a stabilizer when she
allows for market imbalances, while she acts as a destabilizer when she
manages aggressively her inventories and when she trades, especially
if she acts as fundamentalist or if she is a strong extrapolator. Indeed
the more stable institutional framework is one in which the market
makers is inventory neutral and doesn’t trade but, even in this case,
the typical complex behavior of BH98 occurs.
Keywords: Asset pricing model, heterogeneous beliefs, market archi-
tecture, market making, foreign exchange market.
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1 Introduction
Models of financial markets with heterogeneous bounded rational specula-
tors generally come in two flavors. The seminal model of Brock and Hommes
(1998) makes the standard assumption of market clearing. Other models as-
sume instead the existence of a market maker, which accumulates inventories
and adjusts the price in the same direction of net demand following a simple
linear rule (Day and Huang, 1990; Lux, 1995).
The market maker hypothesis is widely considered a better description of
the price adjustment mechanism of actual markets. In particular, it is the
standard assumption for models of the FX market (Westerhoff, 2009). On
the other hand, the standard linear adjustment rule, which is generally used
in these models, might lead to large inventory unbalances. This implication
is inconvenient, since the empirical evidence shows that FX dealers manage
actively their inventories in order to end the trading day on a balanced po-
sition (Manaster and Mann, 1996; Bjønnes and Rime, 2005). To overcome
this limitation, Westerhoff (2003) incorporates inventory management in the
price adjustment rule, showing that a more aggressive control of inventories
makes the market more volatile and less stable.
Equivalent results are obtained by Carraro and Ricchiuti (2015) and Zhu
et al. (2009), who consider market makers that take speculative positions by
adjusting their inventories towards a given exogenous target. These mod-
els don’t derive the pricing rule from an optimizing behavior of the market
maker, instead they rely on ad hoc pricing mechanisms. Following a sim-
ilar path, Hommes et al. (2005) extend the BH98 framework to a market
maker scenario, using a linear adjustment rule, and prove that the dynamic
behavior of the system is pretty similar to BH98. Anufriev and Panchenko
(2009) compare through simulations different market protocols (Walrasian
auctioneer, market maker, batch auction and order book), allowing for the
endogenous evolution of the proportions of speculators. They show that, no
matter which type of market clearing is used, two different regimes with com-
pletely different dynamical properties occur depending on the value of the
intensity of choice, and that the trading protocol strongly affects the critical
value of the intensity of choice.
This paper presents a model which incorporates a more sophisticated rep-
resentation of the behavior of the market maker than the current literature.
In particular, I suppose that there are two types of speculators (fundamental-
ists and chartists) who submit their trades to a monopolistic market maker
who is an optimizing bounded rational agent. I further suppose that the mar-
ket maker knows the optimal demand of speculators, in accordance with the
evidence that market makers profit from their knowledge of the market (see
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Sec. 2). In the first version, profits come only from market making, while in
the second version the market maker might trade on her own account with
bounded rational expectations regarding the future price.
My model confirms the main result of Hommes et al. (2005) while, on
the other hand, it shows that the market maker has conflicting effects on the
stability of the market. From this perspective, my results converge with those
of Zhu et al. (2009) and Carraro and Ricchiuti (2015), who also underline
that the market maker destabilizes the market when she manages aggressively
her inventory. On the other hand, these works provide analytical results
which are restricted to the case of fixed proportions of speculators, while my
results are derived using the heuristic switching mechanism of BH98 which
allows these proportions to evolve endogenously. Moreover, since I derive the
market clearing case of BH98 as a special case, I can prove analytically that
the trading protocol affects the critical values of the intensity of choice, thus
strengthening the results of Anufriev and Panchenko (2009).
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. In sec. 2 I relate
the hypotheses of this paper to the literature on the microstructure of FX
markets. In sec. 3 I present the model with a “pure” market maker, and in
sec. 4 the model with an “activist” market maker. Sec. 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
In this paper I make three critical assumptions: 1) that the market maker
has perfect knowledge of the demand schedule of her customers; 2) that the
market maker is able to satisfy the net demand coming from customers by
adjusting in advance her inventory at the previous market price, i.e. before
she announces the new optimal price to her customers, or equivalently that
she can offload fully its inventory at the previous price on a different market
1; 3) that customers have no informational advantage over the market maker
regarding the fundamental price of the asset.
These hypotheses contradict those of a number of well established models
of market making which rely either on the idea that some customers are
better informed than the market maker (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle,
1985) or on the idea that the market maker sets the price to adjust her
inventory level (Ho and Stoll, 1981; Huang and Stoll, 1997), or again on
both mechanisms (Madhavan and Smidt, 1991). In this section I present
some pieces of evidence which support the framework proposed in this paper.
1This assumption is consistent with the existence of a wholesale market where the
monopolist market maker trades with other smaller, less informed, dealers.
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These derive mostly from the market microstructure literature on the foreign
exchange market.
Indeed the possibility of private information in the FX market has been
questioned since the fundamental value of a currency is determined by macroe-
conomic information, which is publicly available . Instead, insider models like
Kyle (1985) or Glosten and Milgrom (1985) draw their inspiration from the
stock market, where a privileged access to information is more likely to occur.
On the other hand, net order flows are strong predictors of exchange rate
movements (King et al., 2013), and this is considered by most economists
as a clear sign of asymmetric information. What could be the source of pri-
vate information on the FX market if fundamentals are common knowledge?
One possible answer is that private information that is most valuable does
not concern fundamentals. One source of non fundamental information, ac-
cording to King et al. (2013), stems from demand and supply themselves.
In particular, if they have only finite elasticity, i.e. if the liquidity of mar-
kets is limited, market makers can leverage on their role to make profits.
Following this line, Cai et al. (2001) show with high frequency data that
customer order flows have an influence on rates distinct from macroeconomic
announcements. Thus the anticipation of public announcements is not the
only potential source of private information on the foreign exchange market.
This line of thought leads us to the next problem, namely: who is informed
on the FX market? Using a detailed breakdown of customer typologies, Osler
and Vandrovych (2009) show that only leveraged investors bring information
to the market. All other types of customers appear to be uninformed, while
banks themselves, which host the main foreign exchange dealers, appear to
be better informed than their customers. Specifically, the price impact of
bank trades remains strong for up to one week, while the price impact of
leveraged-investors loses significance after six hours.
These result confirm the common view among FX dealers that big banks
are better informed because they trade with the biggest customers (Cheung
and Chinn, 2001). The intuition is that banks, by servicing their customers,
collect dispersed information from the market which they put to a good use
for their own trades. This view is supported also by the empirical evidence
that spreads are narrower for financial customers and for larger trades (Osler
et al., 2011). This stylized fact is inconsistent with adverse selection models,
according to which market makers should charge larger spreads to the most
informed traders and on larger trades, which are more likely to be originated
from informed counterparts. To motivate the actual pricing choices of market
makers we must refer to factors like market power and strategic dealing.
According to this view, FX dealers submit competitive quotes to attract
large order flows because they seek to understand promptly the direction of
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the market.
The opportunity of profits for dealers arise because FX is a two-tier mar-
ket and they may use the information gathered with customers in the first tier
to profit from interdealer trades in the second tier. For instance, the results
of Osler et al. (2011) show that dealers are more likely to trade aggressively
on the interdealer market after trades with informed counterparts.
We might wonder what would be the optimal pricing and trading strat-
egy for a dealer under these circumstances. Empirical evidence shows that
FX dealers unload inventories quickly and do no adjust their quotes on the
interdealer market following an inventory unbalance (Manaster and Mann,
1996; Bjønnes and Rime, 2005). Inventory and adverse selection models agree
instead on the prediction that buyer-initiated trades will make the market
maker raise prices, while seller-initiated trades will have the opposite effect.
But the empirical evidence mentioned above suggests instead that FX dealers
leave their quotes unchanged and profit from the future movement of price by
trading as quickly as possible on the wholesale market in the same direction
of their incoming trades. An optimal trading strategy of this sort is derived
in the widely considered model of Evans and Lyons (2002) and is linked to
the so called “hot potato trading” on the interdealer market (Lyons, 1997),
i.e. the passing through of undesired inventory positions among FX dealers.
We need to remark at this point that the fact that market makers trade
on the interdealer market before they adjust their price quotes does not
exclude that market imbalances affect prices. In order book markets like
the interdealer FX market, an excess of trading in one direction impacts
price since liquidity is not unlimited, and price variations on the wholesale
market are quickly transmitted to prices charged to customers. In the model
of Evans and Lyons (2002) ’profit takers’ clear the market and allow FX
dealers to profit from end-of-day trades after a price adjustment occurs on
the interdealer market which is transmitted to the retail market. Indeed, it
is the trasmission of price variations from the wholesale to the retail market
which makes interdealer trade profitable even for those dealers who are less
informed and thus unlikely to profit when they trade with other dealers.
To sum up, according to the evidence collected from FX market data, we
can state the following: 1) market making is a valuable source of informa-
tion about demand which is used for taking speculative positions; 2) market
makers do not set prices to manage their inventories because they can offload
them on the interdealer market at favourable prices; 3) customers have no
particular informational advantage over market makers. Besides supporting
the assumptions of the models presented here, these pieces of evidence sug-
gest that there cannot be a universal model of market making. Instead, the
institutional specificities of each market must be taken carefully into consid-
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eration by the modeler.
3 “Pure” market maker
I assume that the market maker is a profit maximizing monopolist who trades
a zero yielding asset with a large number of different types of speculators
whose weights on the market evolve endogenously. The market maker trades
also on a separate competitive wholesale market with other dealers. I assume
that the market maker knows the optimal demand of each type of speculator
and that she employs this information when she solves her objective. Then
I suppose that the wholesale market is liquid enough to allow the market
maker to adjust in advance her inventory at the current market price, in
order to match the projected orders of speculators. After this adjustment
she announces the optimal price, taking into account a quadratic cost of
inventory maintenance. Once the new price is revealed to speculators, the
latter trade according to their optimal demand in such a way that, at the
end of the period, the net variation of the inventory position of the market
maker is zero. Finally, the wholesale market price is updated to the optimal
price of the market maker.2
MM fixes pt
MM adjusts 
her inventory
to match projected speculators'
orders by buying / selling
on the wholesale market
at the current price pt-1
MM announces pt
to the speculators
Speculators post
their orders
Trading brings
MM inventory
to zero
The price on the
wholesale market
is updated to pt
Figure 1: Timeline of events occuring within a single period of the model.
The timeline of events in each period of the model is pictured in Fig. 1.
We remark that the assumption on market liquidity is analogous to the one
made by Evans and Lyons (2002), who suppose that FX dealers trade on the
wholesale market before the price adjustment on the retail market occurs. It
is also in line with evidence from the FX market and in particular with the
2 One might alternatively suppose that the optimal price is unknown to the participants
of the wholesale market until the end of the trading period. In this setting, which is
completely equivalent to the one described in the main text, the inventory is adjusted
after trading with speculators.
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practice of “hot potato” trading which allows FX dealers to profit from retail
trading (see Sec. 2).
Recalling that we are considering the case of a zero yielding risky asset,
the wealth of the market maker evolves according to the following equation:
Wd,t = RWd,t−1 + (pt − pt−1) zt − ωz2t (1)
where R is the gross return of a safe asset, pt is the price charged to spec-
ulators at t, pt−1 is the price charged in the previous period which is equal
to the current wholesale price, zt is market net demand and ω measures the
impact of the quadratic inventory cost term on Wt. We remark that, accord-
ing to our hypotheses, the inventory cost is linked to zt since at the end of
each period the inventory is brought down to zero. In practice, it is the cost
of holding an amount of risky asset equal to zt > 0 until it is resold to the
speculators3.
Considering the heterogeneity of the speculators, market demand is de-
fined as follows:
zt =
H−1∑
h=0
nh,tzh,t (2)
where zh,t is the demand of speculators of type h and, following BH98,
nh,t =
e
β Uh,t−1
Zt
is the fraction of speculators of type h. In this formula Zt is
a normalization factor and
Uh,t−1 = (pt−1 −Rpt−2) zh,t−2 − Ch (3)
is the fitness of the trading strategy h, where Ch is a type specific fixed
cost.
The wealth of speculators of type h evolves in a standard way:
Wh,t = RWh,t−1 + (pt −Rpt−1) zh,t−1 (4)
where R has the same meaning as above and the rightmost term on the
right hand side of the equation above represents the excess profit obtained
buying the amount zh,t−1 at the price pt−1 and reselling the same amount at
the price pt.
Both the speculators and the market maker act to maximize their current
wealth, and this maximization is equivalent to a static profit maximization.
Thus I follow the literature on asset pricing with heterogeneous speculators
3 In the case in which zt < 0, we might think that the risky asset must be exchanged
against some other asset and that holding this other asset is costly too.
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mentioned in Sec. 1 and exclude, for simplicity, a more complex forward
looking setting like the one of Madhavan and Smidt (1991). In particular,
speculators are myopic mean-variance maximizers, since their future wealth
is uncertain. Their objective can be written as follows:
max
zh,t
{
Eht [Wt+1]− 1
2D
Vht [Wt+1]
}
(5)
where D−1 is a risk aversion parameter linked to the variance of future wealth
Vht [Wt+1]. Indeed the wealth of speculators at t + 1 is determined by their
net demand at t and they ignore the future market price when taking their
decision. Then we have:
Eht [Wh,t+1] = RWh,t + (Eht [pt+1]−Rpt) zh,t (6)
Vht [Wt+1] = Vht [pt+1] z
2
ht (7)
It is convenient to rewrite the speculator problem in terms of deviations
from a fundamental value xt = pt − p∗t . It is possible to do so by assuming
the standard pricing relationship p∗t = Et[p
∗
t+1]/R. Thus, taking into account
Eqs. (6) and (7) and further supposing for simplicity that Vht [pt+1] = σ
2 is
equal and constant across all types, we may rewrite the objective as follows:
max
zh,t
{
RWh,t + (Eht [xt+1]−Rxt) zh,t − 1
2D
σ2z2ht
}
(8)
Finally, we drop the irrelevant term RWh,t, set the expectation of spec-
ulators of type h on xt to be Eh [xt+1] = bh + ghxt−1, and let the constant
variance σ2 be absorbed by the parameter D−1. Thus we obtain the definitive
formulation of the speculator objective:
max
zh,t
{
(bh + ghxt−1 −Rxt) zh,t −
z2h,t
2D
}
(9)
The market maker instead is not subject to uncertainty. Moreover she is
aware of the optimal demand of speculators z∗h,t when she optimizes. This
assumption is consistent with the monopoly position which market makers
have, especially on markets where the largest part of transactions are over
the counter, like the FX market (see sec. 2). Following these arguments and
dropping the irrelevant term RWd,t−1 the objective of the market maker in
terms of price deviation xt can be written as follows:
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max
xt
(xt − xt−1)
H−1∑
h=0
nh,tz
∗
h,t − ω
(
H−1∑
h=0
nh,tz
∗
h,t
)2 (10)
The optimal demand of speculators of type h, obtained from the FOC of
eq. (9), is the standard one among this type of models:
z∗h,t = D (bh + ghxt−1 −Rxt) (11)
Substituting eq. (11) in (10) and deriving we obtain the FOC for the
market maker which can be solved for xt:
xt =
1
DRω + 1
[
xt−1
2
+
(
Dω +
1
2R
)H−1∑
h=0
[(bh + ghxt−1)nh,t]
]
(12)
Taking into account that the optimal market demand is
z∗t = D
H−1∑
h=0
[(bh + ghxt−1)nh,t]−DRxt (13)
we obtain from eq. (12) the following form:
xt =
1
DRω + 1
[(
Dω +
1
2R
)(
z∗t
D
+Rxt
)
+
xt−1
2
]
(14)
from which we get the linear price adjusting rule that is used in many works
(see Sec. 1):
xt − xt−1 =
(
2ω +
1
DR
)
z∗t (15)
In the two type case of fundamentalists (g0 = 0,b0 = 0, C0 = C > 0) and
chartists (g1 = g > 0,b1 = 0,C1 = 0), eq. (12) becomes
xt =
1
DRω + 1
[
1
2
+ g
(
Dω +
1
2R
)
n1,t
]
xt−1 (16)
In this case, after replacing zht in (3) with (11), n1,t reads as follows:
n1,t =
1
e−β[Dg(Rxt−2−xt−1)xt−3−C] + 1
(17)
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It is convenient to introduce mt ≡ n0,t − n1,t. Then eq. (16) becomes
xt =
1
DRω + 1
[
1
2
− g
(
Dω +
1
2R
)(
mt − 1
2
)]
xt−1 (18)
where
mt = tanh
(
β
2
[Dgc (Rxt−2 − xt−1)xt−3 − C]
)
(19)
The market clearing case of BH98 is obtained for ω →∞:
xt = − g
2R
(mt − 1)xt−1 (20)
From eqs.(18) and (20) we see that x = 0 is always a steady state of the
system. This is usually called the fundamental steady state solution because
the actual price equals the fundamental price. One of the main result of
BH98 is to show that, for the system described by eq. (20), there are addi-
tional non fundamental steady states under appropriate conditions, and that
the fundamental steady state becomes unstable under the same conditions.
This is a key result because it states that the actual price might deviate
systematically from the fundamental price under appropriate conditions, i.e.
that the market may exhibit, under these conditions, a “bubble and burst”
behavior.
Regarding the system described by eq. (18), the following proposition
holds:
Proposition 1. (Existence and stability of steady states). Let mf = tanh
(−βC
2
)
,
mnf = 1−2Rg and x∗ be the positive solution (if it exists) of tanh
[
β
2
(Dg (R− 1)x2 − C)] =
mnf . Then:
1. For 0 < g < R the fundamental equilibrium E0 = (0,mf ) is the unique,
globally stable steady state
2. For g ≥ 2R the fundamental equilibrium is locally unstable and two
other steady states exists: E1 = (x
∗,mnf ) and E2 = (−x∗,mnf )
3. For R < g < 2R there exists β∗ = 1
C
log
(
1
g/R−1
)
∈ (0,∞) such that
(a) if β < β∗ the fundamental equilibrium E0 = (0,mf ) is the unique,
globally stable steady state
(b) if β > β∗ the fundamental equilibrium is locally unstable and two
other steady states exists: E1 = (x
∗,mnf ) and E2 = (−x∗,mnf )
(c) if β = β∗ the fundamental and non fundamental equilibria coincide
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Proof. See Appendix A.
We remark that with the proposition above we recover exactly, for the
system described by eq. (18), the result of BH98, Lemma 2, which is obtained
under the assumption of market clearing, i.e. for the system described by eq.
(20). This includes the fact that at β = β∗ a pitchfork bifurcation occurs
(Fig. 3). Thus we see that the institutional framework of the market has no
effect on the existence of non fundamental equilibria and on the stability of
the fundamental equilibrium. In particular, the existence and stability of the
steady states in BH98 does not depend on the assumption of market clearing.
Moreover, the value of β∗ is independent from the market setting.
Another important result of BH98 (Lemma 3) is to show that there ex-
ists a critical value β∗∗ above which the two non fundamental steady states
become themselves unstable. When β > β∗∗, the system (20) might follow
non trivial dynamical paths and even exhibit complex or chaotic trajectories.
The equivalent of this lemma for the system decribed by eq. (18) is stated
as follows:
Proposition 2. (Secondary Bifurcation). Let E1 and E2 be the non fun-
damental steady states and β∗ be the pitchfork bifurcation value. Assume
R < g < 2R and C > 0 and further suppose that R ∈ (1, 4
3
]
. Then there
exists β∗∗ such that E1 and E2 are stable for β∗ < β < β∗∗ and unstable for
β > β∗∗. For β = β∗∗ E1 and E2 exhibit a Hopf bifurcation.
Proof. See Appendix A.
From the bifurcation plot of Eq. (18) (Fig. 3) we see that at β∗∗ the
(positive) non fundamental steady state becomes unstable and that for higher
values of β there is an oscillating behavior between the fundamental and non
fundamental steady state. The resulting dynamics is qualitatively identical
to the one of the system in BH98 described by Eq. (20).
As stated above, the critical value β∗ of the system described by Eq.
(18) remains the same of Eq. (20). Instead, we see from Fig. 2 that β∗∗ is
decreasing in ω. In other terms, the likelihood that the market will settle
at the non fundamental price is lower in the market clearing case (ω →∞).
Symmetrically, the more the market maker is inventory neutral (ω → 0), the
more the market is likely to settle at the non fundamental steady state.
BH98 prove (Lemma 4) that, for β →∞, if g > R2 the system described
by eq. (20) is globally unstable, while if R < g < R2 the same system
displays homoclinic orbits, i.e. closed trajectories which join the fundamental
steady state (which in this case is a saddle point) to itself. This result is
important because it suggests that, for high values of β, the system can
11
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Figure 2: Value of β∗∗ with D = C = 1, R = 1.03.
be characterized by complex and eventually chaotic trajectories around the
fundamental equilibrium. The existence of homoclinic orbits depends on
the fact that the unstable manifold around the fundamental steady state is
bounded, where the unstable manifold may be loosely defined as the set of
points that are sent away from a fixed point as time moves forward. On
the other hand, if the unstable manifold is unbounded and the system has
no homoclinic orbits, this means that any orbit starting at the fundamental
steady state will never come back in a neighborhood of the steady state itself.
Since in this case the typical paths of xt are diverging to infinity, this is also
an important situation to consider from an economic point of view because
it suggests that, under these conditions, the market is going to crash.
On this matter, in the case of Eq. (18) it’s possible to prove the following
proposition:
Proposition 3. Assume C > 0 and β → ∞. For g > R the fundamen-
tal steady state E0 = (0,−1) is locally unstable, with eigenvalues 0 and
R+(2DRω+1)g
2R(DRω+1)
. Let’s fix g¯0 =
R(2DR2ω+2R−1)
2DRω+1
. There are two possibilities for
the unstable manifold W u(E0):
1. if g > g¯0 then W
u(E0) equals the unstable eigenvector and is unbounded
2. if R < g < g¯0 then W
u(E0) is bounded and all orbits converge to E0
Proof. See Appendix A.
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Figure 3: (a) Bifurcation diagram with 3 ≤ β ≤ 8 and (b) periodic orbit
for β = 6. The value of the other parameters are fixed as in Fig. 2, panel
(a). The red crosses stand for the value of the non fundamental solution x∗
obtained from eq. (31)
Apart from the value of the threshold g0, the proposition above replicates
Lemma 4 of BH98, showing that there are no deep mathematical differences,
under this respect, between Eqs. (18) and (20).
From Fig. 4 we see that the threshold g0 is decreasing in ω, which means
that the global stability of the market depends on the behavior of the market
maker. We recover the result of BH98 considering the limit ω → ∞, where
g¯0 = R
2. Instead for ω → 0 we obtain the upper bound g¯0 = R(2R−1). Thus
the activity of the market maker, which absorbs the imbalance of supply and
demand, makes the market less likely to suffer from severe instability which
might call for an external intervention.
As final comment, I would like to stress the remarkable difference between
the three results of this section. According to Proposition 1, the market
maker has no impact whatsoever on the existence and stability of the fun-
damental steady state, as well as on the existence of the non fundamental
steady states. Instead, according to Fig. 2, the market maker increases the
critical value β∗∗ above which the non fundamental steady state become un-
stable. On the other hand, from Fig. 2 we see also that any value of β∗∗ that
can be obtained by choosing a value of ω can be also obtained by choosing
a value of g. Thus, in this case, what we can obtain with a market maker
which reacts more strongly to inventory imbalances we can obtain as well
with a chartist speculator with a stronger extrapolative behavior. Accord-
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ing to Proposition 3, finally, the existence of the market maker improves the
global stability of the system for any given behavioral attitude of the chartist
speculators. Therefore we might consider the last one as the stronger of our
results.
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Figure 4: g0 for different values of ω. The values of the other parameters
are: D = 1, R = 1.03.
4 “Activist” market maker
We extend the model of the previous section supposing that the market maker
acts as a mean-variance optimizing speculator too. Her objective becomes
max
xt,yt
(xt − xt−1)
H−1∑
h=0
nh,tz
∗
h,t − ω
(
H−1∑
h=0
nh,tz
∗
h,t
)2
+ (gd −R)xtyt − y
2
t
2D

(21)
The first two terms represent the variation of wealth Wd,t obtained with
market making, which is equal to Eq. ( 10 ). The two additional terms
represent the risk-adjusted expected net profit derived from trading and can
be obtained through the same arguments which we have used for speculators
in Sec. 3. In particular yt represents the speculative demand of the market
maker at t and gd is her extrapolation parameter for the future price devi-
ation, i.e. Ed[xt+1] = gdxt. In fact we assume that the market maker has
bounded rational expectations regarding the future price. Finally, we assume
that the risk aversion parameter and the variance of the future price are the
same as those of the speculators so that both factors are still absorbed by
the parameter D.
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Unlike the model of the previous section, the market maker in this case
may end the trading period with a net variation of her inventory of the risky
asset, which is equal to yt. Moreover, the two components of the objective
function cannot be decoupled because the price set by the market maker
impacts on her expectation of future prices. Excluding this impact would
have made the market maker’s rationality appear really too limited: since she
sets the current price based on market demand, she can use this information
to forecast the future price.
Of course we might conceive the market maker as more far-sighted in
considering in her expectation the fact that future prices depend not only
on her current price setting decisions but also on the future ones. However
an explicit inclusion of this factor would have made the model much more
complicated. The actual formulation Ed[xt+1] = gdxt might be considered
instead a reduced form for the belief that the excess demand of speculators
is autocorrelated enough to make future price deviations autocorrelated too.
Indeed the market maker is likely to be aware that a positive net demand
zt is pushing herself to raise the price and that this higher price will feed
back positively into the future demand of chartist speculators. Thus we may
conclude that the mechanism of expectation formation we have conjectured
for the market maker, although it is of a heuristic kind, is consistent with
the actual working of the model. Furthermore, this formulation allows to
examine the case of a disagreement of expectations between the speculators
and the market maker which might lead to instability.
Substituting the optimal demand (11) in the objective (21) and deriving
for xt and yt we obtain the FOCs. In particular from the FOC with respect
to yt we obtain the optimal trading strategy for the market maker:
yt = D (gd −R)xt (22)
Thus the market maker will trade in the same direction of xt only if the
extrapolative component of her expectation is strong enough. Substituting
(22) in the other FOC and solving for xt we obtain the following price equa-
tion:
xt =
Rxt−1 + (2DRω + 1)
∑H−1
h=0 (bh + ghxt−1)nh,t
2R (DRω + 1)− (R− gd)2
(23)
We see that the price equation is defined only if gd 6= R±
√
2R(DRω + 1),
a fact which hints at the importance of the expectations of the market maker
for the stability of the market. The results that follow are derived supposing
that gd belongs to the interval
(
R−√R(2DRω + 1), R +√R(2DRω + 1)),
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so that these two singularities are ruled out. Within this interval we see that
price deviations xt are increasing in past price deviations xt−1 as it happens
in eqs. (12), (18) and (20).
Proceeding as in the previous model, from eqs. (23) and (13) we get the
following form:
xt =
R
R− (R− gd)2
xt−1 +
2DRω + 1
D
[
R− (R− gd)2
]z∗t (24)
We see that the linear rule of the previous model is recovered for gd = R,
i.e. when the market maker doesn’t trade (see eq. (22)). If gd = R ±
√
R
the coefficients of xt−1 and zt diverge but this singularity is removable since
the reduced form dynamics is still defined. If gd /∈
[
R−√R, R +√R
]
the same coefficients become negative, while for gd ∈
(
R−√R, R +√R
)
they are positive. In the latter case, the behavior of the market maker may
be still described by a linear pricing rule, with resulting price deviations at t,
for the same past price deviations xt−1 and market excess demand zt, which
will be larger than in the previous model. A fundamentalist market maker
(gd = 0), instead, will reply to a positive price deviation and excess demand
with a price decrease, following her own beliefs, and thus she will be more
likely to cause instability over the market (see below).
The remaining part of this section will be dedicated to examine the two
type case of fundamentalists (g0 = 0,b0 = 0, C0 = C > 0) and chartists
(g1 = gc > 0,b1 = 0,C1 = 0) which has been already examined in the previous
section, with the purpose to extend the results of that section to the actual
framework. In the two types case eq. (23) becomes
xt =
R + gc (2DRω + 1) n1,t
2R (DRω + 1)− (R− gd)2
xt−1 (25)
where n1,t is still given by eq. (17). After having replaced n1,t =
1−mt
2
we
obtain
xt =
R− gc (2DRω + 1) mt − 1
2
2R (DRω + 1)− (R− gd)2
xt−1 (26)
where mt is still given by eq. (19). The BH98 equation (20) is obtained
for ω → ∞ and gd → R, i.e. when the market maker doesn’t accumulate
inventories and doesn’t trade.
The equation (26) has a fundamental steady state solution x = 0, like
the model of the previous section, which becomes likewise unstable due to a
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pitchfork bifurcation which occurs when the following equality holds:
gc =
(
1 + e−βC
) [
R− (gd −R)
2
2DRω + 1
]
(27)
Accordingly, we can extend to the actual framework, with some adjust-
ments, the results that there are additional non fundamental steady states
under appropriate conditions, and that the fundamental steady state becomes
unstable under the same conditions. In particular, the following proposition
holds:
Proposition 4. (Existence and stability of steady states). Let
mnf = 1− 2R
gc
+
2 (R− gd)2
gc (2DRω + 1)
and x∗ be the positive solution (if it exists) of tanh
[
β
2
(Dgc (R− 1)x2 − C)
]
=
mnf . Further suppose that gd ∈
(
R−√R(2DRω + 1), R +√R(2DRω + 1)).
Then:
1. For 0 < gc < R− (R−gd)
2
(2DRω+1)
the fundamental equilibrium E0 = (0,mf ) is
the unique, globally stable steady state
2. For gc > 2
[
R− (R−gd)2
(2DRω+1)
]
the fundamental equilibrium is locally un-
stable and two other steady states exist: E1 = (x
∗,mnf ) and E2 =
(−x∗,mnf )
3. For 0 < R − (R−gd)2
(2DRω+1)
< gc < 2
[
R− (R−gd)2
(2DRω+1)
]
there exists β∗ =
1
C
log
(
1−mnf
1+mnf
)
∈ (0,∞) such that
(a) if β < β∗ the fundamental equilibrium E0 = (0,mf ) is the unique,
globally stable steady state
(b) if β > β∗ the fundamental equilibrium is locally unstable and two
other steady states exist: E1 = (x
∗,mnf ) and E2 = (−x∗,mnf )
(c) if β = β∗ the fundamental and non fundamental equilibria coincide
Proof. See Appendix A.
The combinations of values of gc and gd which are consistent with the
hypotheses of Proposition 4 are represented in Fig. (5). The light grey area
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represents the combinations for which the fundamental steady state is always
stable, the dark grey area the combinations for which β∗ ∈ (0,∞) exists. We
see that the chartist expectation of the market maker lowers the thresholds
of gc for which the fundamental steady state becomes unstable and those for
which β∗ exists, when compared with the thresholds of the previous model,
except when gd = R.
0 1 2
gd
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
2.00
g c
R
R
2R
Figure 5: Values of gc and gd which are consistent with the hypotheses of
Proposition 4: stability of the fundamental steady state (light grey); existence
of β∗ ∈ (0,∞) (dark gray). The values of the other parameters are: D =
C = ω = 1, R = 1.03.
From Fig. 6, panel (a), we see that β∗ is increasing in ω and converges
to β∗ = 1
C
log
(
1
gc/R−1
)
for ω → ∞. In this limit we recover the result of
BH98 and of Sec. 3. This means that, the more the market maker is oriented
against holding inventories, the more she can compensate for her own trading
activity and try to keep the market anchored to the fundamental equilibrium.
Except that in this limit, an activist market maker is more likely to make
the market evolve towards a non fundamental steady state than a passive
market maker. Indeed, from fig. 6, panel (b), we see that β∗ is increasing in
gd up to gd = R and decreasing for gd > R. Thus the effect of an increasingly
extrapolative chartist market maker on market stability is not monotonic:
stabilizing for gd < R and destabilizing for gd > R. When gd = R, we
recover again the same β∗ of BH98 and of Sec. 3. For any other gd 6= R
we have instead that β∗ is lower than in those two models. Thus an activist
market maker makes the market less stable than a passive market maker
except that in this case, in which we recover the same level of stability of Sec
3 because the market maker is not trading at all (see eq. (22)). Moreover,
the effect of a chartist market maker is to improve the stability of the market
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with respect to a fundamentalist market maker (gd = 0) for any gd ∈ (0, 2R).
From eq. (24) we see that a fundamentalist market maker lowers the price
in front of excess market demand and this explains the negative effect on
market stability.
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Figure 6: Value of β∗ for different values of ω and gd. The other parameters
are fixed at the following values: D = C = 1, R = 1.03, gc = 1.05.
According to Proposition 2 of the previous Section there exists a criti-
cal value β∗∗ above which the two non fundamental steady states become
themselves unstable. We have already underlined that this result is impor-
tant because, when this condition occurs, the system might follow non triv-
ial dynamical paths and even exhibit complex or chaotic trajectories. The
equivalent of Proposition 2 for the system decribed by eq. (26) is stated as
follows:
Proposition 5. (Secondary Bifurcation). Let E1 and E2 be the non funda-
mental steady states as in Proposition 4. Assume 0 ≤ R − (R−gd)2
(2DRω+1)
< gc <
2
[
R− (R−gd)2
(2DRω+1)
]
, gd ∈
(
R−√R(2DRω + 1), R +√R(2DRω + 1)) and
C > 0. Let β∗ ≥ 0 be the pitchfork bifurcation value. Further suppose that
R ≤ 4
3
. Then there exists β∗∗ such that E1 and E2 are stable for β∗ < β < β∗∗
and unstable for β > β∗∗. For β = β∗∗ E1 and E2 exhibit a Hopf bifurcation.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The numerical analysis of the discriminant of the characteristic equation
at the non fundamental steady states and the numerical computation of its
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solutions yield essentially the same results of the previous model. There is
an interval of values of β in which the discriminant is negative and thus there
exist two conjugate complex roots which cross the unit circle at a value β∗∗.
At this critical value the non fundamental steady state becomes unstable
and for higher values of β we observe an oscillating behavior between the
fundamental and non fundamental steady states. The resulting dynamics is
qualitatively identical to the 3-D system in BH98 and to the one depicted in
Fig. 3.
We remark that, using the same parameter values ω = D = C = 1 and
R = 1.03, plus gc = 1.05 we obtain that the critical values β
∗∗ are lower
than in Sec. 3 except when gd = R and the market maker doesn’t trade
(Fig. 7, panels (a) and (c)). Moreover, β∗∗ is decreasing in ω and thus the
same considerations apply, namely that market making is making the non
fundamental steady states more likely to be stable.
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Figure 7: Value of β∗∗ with D = C = 1, R = 1.03.
As final step, we replicate the results concerning homoclinic orbits and
global instability of the previous Section. The equivalent of Proposition 3 of
Sec. 3, which is still based on the boundedness of the unstable manifold, is
stated as follows:
Proposition 6. Assume C > 0, gd ∈
(
R−√R(2DRω + 1), R +√R(2DRω + 1))
and β → ∞. Suppose that gc > R − (R−gd)
2
(2DRω+1)
≥ 0 so that the fundamental
steady state E0 = (0,−1) is locally unstable. Let’s fix
g¯1 =
R
2DRω+1
[
2R (DRω + 1)− (R− gd)2 − 1
]
. There are two possibilities
for the unstable manifold W u(E0):
1. if gc > g¯1 then W
u(E0) equals the unstable eigenvector and is unbounded
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2. if R − (R−gd)2
(2DRω+1)
< gc < g¯1 then W
u(E0) is bounded and all orbits
converge to E0
Proof. See Appendix A.
From Fig. 8 we see that the effect of ω on g1 is the same of the one
on g0 in previous model, thus market making still has a stabilizing effect
compared to market clearing. On the other hand we see from panel (b) that
the speculative activity of the market maker makes the market more likely
of being globally unstable because it lowers the threshold g1 with a behavior
that is equivalent to the one of fig. 6, panel (b).
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Figure 8: Value of g1 for different values of ω and gd. The other parameters
are fixed at the following values: D = C = 1, R = 1.03.
The combinations of values of the parameters gd and gc for which homo-
clinic orbits exist are represented by the dark grey areas of Fig. 9. We see that
for ω →∞ the dark grey area becomes thinner because the higher boundary,
corresponding to g1, shifts downwards. At the same time, the threshold of gc
above which the model becomes unstable is lower when compared with the
thresholds of the previous model, except when gd = R. Moreover, except in
the same case, the range of values of gc for which homoclinic orbits exist for
a given gd (i.e. the height of the dark grey area) is also smaller than in the
previous model, where it is given by the fixed difference g0 −R.
Following the same kind of arguments proposed at the end of the previous
section, in this case we might summarize the results by saying, in the first
place, that the trading activity of the market maker, contrary to the previous
model, has an impact on the existence and stability of the fundamental steady
state and that this effect occurs for any value of gc, i.e. it is independent from
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Figure 9: Combinations of gd and gc for which homoclinic orbits exist. The
other parameters are fixed at the following values: D = C = 1, R = 1.03.
the aggressiveness of chartists according to Proposition 4, although the value
of β∗ depends also on gc. The interpretation of the other two results instead
can be very similar to the previous model. Indeed from Fig. 6 we see that any
value of β∗∗ that can be obtained by choosing a value of ω or gd can be also
obtained by choosing a value of gc. Thus, as in the previous case, what we
can obtain with a specific behavior of the market maker we can obtain as well
with a more aggressive chartist speculator. Instead, according to Proposition
(6), the existence of the market maker impacts the global stability of the
system for any given behavioral attitude of the chartist speculators. What
is different is that the threshold for global instability might be lowered, and
thus the system might become more likely to be globally unstable, if the
market maker trades.
5 Conclusions
The dynamic behavior of the models presented in this paper is qualitatively
identical to the one described in BH98, which is derived as a special case
in this setting. This shows that the complex dynamics of that model is in-
dependent from the institutional framework of the market and in particular
from the assumption of market clearing. While this result was already estab-
lished, under a different setting, by Hommes et al. (2005), I show that the
market maker has conflicting effects on the stability of the market. She acts
as a stabilizer when she allows for market imbalances, and as a destabilizer
when she manages aggressively her inventories or when she trades actively.
In particular, the speculative behavior of the market maker becomes critical
22
for the stability of the market because it limits the behavior of the specu-
lators, although some thresholds, and especially those governing the global
instability of the model (Propositions (3) and (6)), are independent from the
behavioral parameters of the speculators. Indeed, according to the two mod-
els presented here the more stable institutional framework is one in which
the market maker is inventory neutral and doesn’t trade at all, but even in
this scenario the typical complex behavior of BH98 occurs.
It is less straightforward to compare the results of this paper with other
works which employ a dynamic optimization setting instead of the static
optimization setting which is customary in models with bounded rational
heterogeneous agents. For instance, Leach and Madhavan (1993) suppose
that the market maker might deviate from a statically optimal price because
she takes into account the effect of her current pricing decision on the future
trading of her counterparts and thus on her future wealth. This strategy
might lend more stability to markets (in particular avoiding that the market
shuts down) at the cost of wider spreads. But these results rely on the critical
assumption the some speculators are more informed than the market maker,
which is exluded from the present framework. The same considerations apply
to the model of Madhavan and Smidt (1991), which is somewhat similar to
this paper in spirit because it considers a market maker which is both a
dealer and a speculator, but again depends critically on the hypothesis of
information asymmetry.
A critical assumption of this paper is that the wholesale market is always
perfectly liquid for the market maker. This hypothesis is required to achieve
positive profits since it allows the market maker to adjust her inventory at a
favourable price. By making this assumption, we are implicitly introducing
some liquidity provider of last resort in the model. Who might play this role
in the FX market? One option are hedgers, like non financial corporations,
who represent important actors on the FX market. The model of Evans
and Lyons (2002) includes two distinct classes of agents besides dealers: the
first one, represented by speculators, demands liquidity from FX dealers at
the beginning of the day, the second one, represented by hedgers or “profit
takers”, supplies to dealers the necessary liquidity to balance the market.
Empirical evidence confirms that financial customers demand liquidity while
hedgers are net liquidity providers (King et al., 2013). Alternatively, we
should not disregard banks: given the pivotal role of the banking sector
in the FX market, their highly elastic supply of liquidity accomodates the
needs of the operators on the money markets for the domestic currency and,
through liquidity swaps arranged by central banks, for the most traded for-
eign currencies. A more careful assessment of this topic is left for future
research.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Starting from eq. (18), the steady state must satisfy
the following equation:
x∗ =
1
DRω + 1
[
1
2
− g
(
Dω +
1
2R
)
g
m∗ − 1
2
]
x∗ (28)
where
m∗ = n∗0 − n∗1 = tanh
[
β
2
(−C +Dg (R− 1) (x∗)2)] (29)
The non fundamental solution is obtained by solving the following equa-
tion
m∗ = 1− 2R
g
(30)
We obtain that
x∗ =
√
Cβ + log
(
g
R
− 1)
Dβg (R− 1) (31)
Since x∗ must be real, the following must hold:( g
R
− 1
)
eCβ ≥ 1 (32)
solving for g we obtain g ≥ R (1 + e−Cβ). Letting β →∞ we obtain the
first claim, letting β → 0 the second claim regarding the existence of two
symmetric non fundamental steady states.
The positive eigenvalue at the fundamental steady state is
λ =
2R + g (2DRω + 1)
[
tanh
(
βC
2
)
+ 1
]
4R (DRω + 1)
(33)
Solving for g the inequality λ < 1 we obtain that the fundamental steady
state is locally stable if 0 < g < R
(
1 + e−Cβ
)
. Letting β → ∞ we obtain
the first claim, letting β → 0 the second claim regarding the stability of the
fundamental steady state.
Solving for β the equality λ = 1 we obtain the critical value
β∗ =
1
C
log
(
1
g/R− 1
)
(34)
We see that for R < g < 2R we have that β∗ ∈ (0,∞). The last claim is
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proved by substituting β∗ into eq. (31) since in this case we obtain x∗ = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. The characteristic equation for the stability of the
non fundamental steady states is
P (λ,K) = λ3 − λ2
(
K
R
+ 1
)
+Kλ+K
(
1− 1
R
)
= 0 (35)
where
K = − gcC
8 (R− 1) (DRω + 1) (β − β
∗) (2DRω + 1)
(
m2nf − 1
)
(36)
mnf ≡ 1− 2Rg and β∗ is defined as in eq. (34). Under the hypotheses we
have β > β∗ and −1 < mnf < 0, thus K > 0.
The critical points of P (λ,K) are
xcritical =
1
3R
(
K +R±
√
(K +R)2 − 3KR2
)
(37)
We see that for K > 0 and (K +R)2− 3KR2 ≥ 0, the two critical points
are real and positive. Since the derivative of G(K) ≡ (K +R)2 − 3KR2 is
increasing in K, while the second derivative is strictly positive, G(K) has a
global minimum at K∗ = R
2
(3R− 2) > 0. If we substitute back K∗ into G we
obtain that the minimum of G is G(K∗) = −9R4
4
+ 3R3 which is nonnegative
if the following holds
1 < R ≤ 4
3
(38)
which we assume is true from now on. From the fact that K is strictly
positive we derive
P (−1, K) = − 2
R
(K +R) < 0
P (0, K) =
K
R
(R− 1) > 0
P (1, K) =
2K
R
(R− 1) > 0
Thus the smallest of the three roots is always real and comprised between
-1 and 0. The two other roots instead have always a positive real part. In
fact the positive larger critical point lies to the left of the largest root if the
latter is real, or otherwise it coincides with the real part of the two complex
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conjugate roots. On the other hand, the positive smaller critical point lies
to the left of the smaller of the two real roots or to the left of the real part
of the two complex conjugate roots.
In order to show that the largest root crosses the unit circle for β → ∞
it suffices to show that the largest critical point is increasing in K, since we
know that K is increasing in β and since the largest critical point is a lower
bound for the absolute value of the largest root in absolute terms. Now we
differentiate the largest critical point wrt K:
∂xcritical
∂K
=
1
3R
1 + K − 3R22 +R√
−3KR2 + (K +R)2
 (39)
We consider the following lower bound:
1
3R
(
1 +
−3R2
2
+R
K +R
)
which is increasing in K for R ≥ 1. We need to prove that it is nonnega-
tive. Solving the inequality for K we obtain
K ≥ R
2
(3R− 4) (40)
which is automatically satisfied since K > 0 as soon as R ≤ 4/3.
In order to prove that we have a Hopf bifurcation we observe that if the
largest real root would become equal to unity while K increases, we would
necessarily have that P (1, K) = 0 for some value of K, something which
contradicts our previous statements.
Proof of Proposition 3. Following BH98, in order to prove the claim we need
to show that, when the fundamental steady state is unstable, the system
returns to the fundamental steady state for some T > 0 if and only if g <
R(2DR2ω+2R−1)
2DRω+1
.
When β →∞ we have that mf ≡ tanh
(−β C
2
)→ −1 and the fundamen-
tal steady state is E0 = (0,−1). The eigenvalues at the fundamental steady
state are (0, 0, λ∞) with
λ∞ =
R + (2DRω + 1)g
2R (DRω + 1)
(41)
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We suppose that g > R, thus the fundamental steady state is unstable
since λ∞ > 1. The eigenvector associated with λ∞ is
(2DRgω+R+g)2
4R2(DRω+1)2
2DRgω+R+g
2R(DRω+1)
1
 (42)
We know that the system evolves according to eqs. (18) and (19), which
we reproduce here for convenience of the reader:
xt =
2R− g (2DRω + 1) (mt − 1)
4R (DRω + 1)
xt−1 (18)
mt = tanh
(
β
2
(Dgc (Rxt−2 − xt−1)xt−3 − C)
)
(19)
Let’s consider the following expression
Ct ≡ Dg (Rxt−2 − xt)xt−3 (43)
we see that for β →∞
mt =
{
+1 if Ct > C
−1 if Ct < C (44)
Let’s suppose that, starting from the fundamental steady state, a small
shock occurs at t = −2 and is propagated until t = 0. Then we have
x−2 = 
x−1 =
2R− g (2DRω + 1) (m−1 − 1)
4R (DRω + 1)

x0 =
[
2R− g (2DRω + 1) (m0 − 1)
4R (DRω + 1)
] [
2R− g (2DRω + 1) (m−1 − 1)
4R (DRω + 1)
]

By hypothesis we know that m−2 = −1. Furthermore C−1 = C0 = 0 thus
m−1 = m0 = −1. As a consequence we obtain the following:
x−1 = λ∞
x0 = λ
2
∞
From our hypotheses we see that the system is on an explosive path. Any
trajectory starting in a neighborhood of the fundamental steady state will
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move along the unstable eigenvector until mt = −1 and thus will diverge to
infinity unless mT = 1 for some T > 0. In fact in this case we have that
xT+1 =
xT
2 (DRω + 1)
(45)
and thus xT+t → 0 for t → ∞ as long as CT+t > C. This eventuality
depends on the evolution of the value of Ct over time. In particular, if
Ct → ∞ monotonically for t → ∞ then for some T > 0 the conclusion
follows.
Let’s suppose that Ct−k < C for all 0 ≤ k ≤ t (otherwise the conclusion
already follows) so that mt−k = −1. Substituting in Ct the iterated values
obtained from an initial shock  occurred at t = −2 we obtain
Ct = D
2gc (λ
∞)2t+1 (R− λ∞) (46)
which will diverge to ±∞ depending on the sign of the rightmost term.
Thus the conclusion follows solving the condition R− λ∞ > 0 for g:
g <
R (2DR2ω + 2R− 1)
2DRω + 1
(47)
We recover the result of BH98 considering the limit ω →∞ where we obtain
that g < R2.
Proof of Proposition 4. The steady state solutions must satisfy the following
equation:
x∗ =
R− (2DRω + 1) gc m
∗ − 1
2
2R (DRω + 1)− (R− gd)2
x∗ (48)
where m∗ is defined as in eq. (29). The non fundamental solution is
obtained by solving the following equation:
m∗ = mnf (49)
where
mnf ≡ 1− 2R
gc
+
2 (R− gd)2
gc (2DRω + 1)
(50)
We obtain that
x∗ =
√√√√Cβ + log (1+mnf1−mnf )
Dβgc (R− 1) (51)
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Since x∗ must be real, the following must hold:
eβC
1 +mnf
1−mnf ≥ 1 (52)
This expression is increasing in mnf and the reader can easily check that
mnf is increasing in gc under the hypothesis we make on gd. Thus, solving
the condition for gc we obtain
gc ≥
(
R− (R− gd)
2
2DRω + 1
)(
1 + e−βC
)
(53)
Letting β →∞ we obtain the first claim, letting β → 0 the second claim
regarding the existence of two symmetric non fundamental steady states.
The non trivial eigenvalue at the fundamental steady state is
λ =
2R + gc (2DRω + 1)
[
tanh
(
βC
2
)
+ 1
]
4R (DRω + 1)− 2 (R− gd)2
(54)
The reader can check that λ is positive and finite under the hypothesis
made on gd. We see that λ is increasing in gc. Solving the inequality λ < 1
for gc we obtain that the fundamental steady state is locally stable if the
following condition holds
0 < gc <
(
R− (R− gd)
2
2DRω + 1
)(
1 + e−βC
)
(55)
Letting β →∞ we obtain the first claim, letting β → 0 the second claim
regarding the stability of the fundamental steady state.
Solving the equality λ = 1 for β we obtain the critical value β∗:
β∗ =
1
C
log
(
1−mnf
1 +mnf
)
(56)
It’s easy to check that, under the hypothesis made on gd, we have that
β∗ ∈ (0,∞) for 0 ≤ R − (R−gd)2
(2DRω+1)
< gc < 2
[
R− (R−gd)2
(2DRω+1)
]
. The last claim
of the proposition is proved by substituting β∗ into eq. (51) since in this case
we obtain x∗ = 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. The characteristic equation for the stability of the
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non fundamental steady states is
P (λ,K) = λ3 − λ2
(
K
R
+ 1
)
+Kλ+K
(
1− 1
R
)
= 0 (57)
where
K = − RgcC
(R− 1) [8R (DRω + 1)− 4 (R− gd)2] (β − β∗) (2DRω + 1) (m2nf − 1)
(58)
and mnf and β
∗ are defined as in eqs. (50) and (56) respectively. Under
the hypotheses we have β > β∗ and −1 < mnf < 0, thus the sign of K de-
pends on the sign of F (K) ≡ 8R (DRω + 1)−4 (R− gd)2 which is increasing
in ω. We have that F (K) > 0 if the following condition holds:
ω >
1
DR2
[
1
2
(R− gd)2 −R
]
(59)
Since gd ∈
(
R−√R(2DRω + 1), R +√R(2DRω + 1)) we can derive
the following inequality:
ω >
1
DR
(
(2DRω + 1)
2
− 1
)
= ω − 1
2DR
(60)
which is always satisfied given our hypotheses on the parameters. Thus
the condition (59) is satisfied by our assumptions and we obtain that K > 0.
Following the same arguments of Proposition 2, we obtain the conclusion.
Proof of Proposition 6. The argument follows the same lines of the proof of
Proposition 2. In particular, the eigenvalues at the fundamental steady state
for β →∞ are (0, 0, λ∞) with
λ∞ =
(2DRω + 1)gc +R
2R(DRω + 1)− (R− gd)2 (61)
The reader can check that, under the hypotheses, λ∞ is finite and greater
than unity. The system evolves according to eq. (26) which we reproduce
for convenience of the reader:
xt =
R− gc (2DRω + 1) mt − 1
2
2R (DRω + 1)− (R− gd)2
xt−1 (26)
31
where mt is given by eq. (19). Introducing a shock at t = −2 and
repeating the steps of Proposition 3 we obtain that x0 = λ
2
∞ and m0 = −1.
As long as mt = −1 for t > 0, we obtain that xt = λ2+t∞  and the system is
on an explosive path. Instead if mT = 1 for some T > 0 we have that
xT+1 =
R
2R (DRω + 1)− (R− gd)2
xT (62)
The reader can check that under the hypotheses made on gd the coefficient
on the RHS is positive and smaller than unity, then xT+t → 0 for t→∞ as
long as CT+t > C. The expression for Ct is the same of eq. (46). Thus the
conclusion follows from the following condition:
gc <
R
2DRω + 1
[
2R (DRω + 1)− (R− gd)2 − 1
]
(63)
We recover the result of BH98 considering the limit ω → ∞ where we
obtain gc < R
2. In the limit ω → 0 we obtain instead the following upper
bound:
gc < R
[
2R− 1− (R− gd)2
]
(64)
32
References
Mikhail Anufriev, Valentyn Panchenko,Asset prices, traders’ behavior and
market design,Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,Volume 33, Is-
sue 5,2009,Pages 1073-1090.
William A. Brock, Cars H. Hommes,Heterogeneous beliefs and routes to
chaos in a simple asset pricing model, Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, Volume 22, Issues 8–9, 1998, Pages 1235-1274.
Geir Høidal Bjønnes, Dagfinn Rime,Dealer behavior and trading systems
in foreign exchange markets, Journal of Financial Economics,Volume 75,
Issue 3,2005,Pages 571-605.
Jun Cai, Yan-Leung Cheung, Raymond S.K. Lee, Michael Melvin,‘Once-
in-a-generation’ yen volatility in 1998: fundamentals, intervention, and
order flow,Journal of International Money and Finance,Volume 20, Issue
3,2001,Pages 327-347.
Alessandro Carraro, Giorgio Ricchiuti,Heterogeneous fundamentalists
and market maker inventories,Chaos, Solitons & Fractals,Volume
79,2015,Pages 73-82.
Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie David Chinn, Currency traders and exchange rate
dynamics: a survey of the US market, Journal of International Money and
Finance, Volume 20, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 439-471
Richard H. Day, Weihong Huang,Bulls, bears and market sheep,Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization,Volume 14, Issue 3,1990,Pages 299-
329.
Evans, Martin D. D., and Richard K. Lyons. “Order Flow and Exchange
Rate Dynamics.” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 110, no. 1, 2002, pp.
170–180. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/324391.
Michael R. King, Carol L. Osler, Dagfinn Rime,The market microstructure
approach to foreign exchange: Looking back and looking forward,Journal
of International Money and Finance,Volume 38,2013,Pages 95-119,
Kyle, Albert S. “Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading.” Econometrica,
vol. 53, no. 6, 1985, pp. 1315–1335., www.jstor.org/stable/1913210.
Lawrence R. Glosten, Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, ask and transaction prices in
a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders, Journal of Fi-
nancial Economics, Volume 14, Issue 1, 1985, Pages 71-100.
33
Ho, T., Stoll, H.R., 1981. Optimal dealer pricing under transactions and
return uncertainty. Journal of Financial Economics 9, 47–73.
Cars Hommes, Hai Huang, Duo Wang,A robust rational route to random-
ness in a simple asset pricing model,Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control,Volume 29, Issue 6,2005,Pages 1043-1072.
Huang, R.D., Stoll, H.R., 1997. The components of the bid–ask spread: A
general approach. Review of Financial Studies 10, 995–1034.
J. Chris Leach, Ananth N. Madhavan, Price Experimentation and Security
Market Structure, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 6, Issue 2,
April 1993, Pages 375–404,
Lyons, Richard K. (1997). A Simultaneous Trade Model of the Foreign Ex-
change Hot Potato. Journal of International Economics, 42, pp. 275–298.
Lux, Thomas. “Herd Behaviour, Bubbles and Crashes.” The Economic
Journal, vol. 105, no. 431, 1995, pp. 881–896. JSTOR, JSTOR,
www.jstor.org/stable/2235156.
Madhavan, A., Smidt, S., 1991. A Bayesian model of intraday specialist
pricing. Journal of Financial Economics 30, 99–134.
Manaster, S., Mann, S.C., 1996. Life in the pits: competitive market making
and inventory control. Review of Financial Studies 9, 953–976.
Osler, Carol L. and Vandrovych, Vitaliy, Hedge Funds and the
Origins of Private Information in Currency Markets (April
2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1484711 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1484711.
Carol L. Osler, Alexander Mende, Lukas Menkhoff,Price discovery in cur-
rency markets,Journal of International Money and Finance,Volume 30, Is-
sue 8,2011,Pages 1696-1718
Peiers, Bettina. “Informed Traders, Intervention, and Price Leadership: A
Deeper View of the Microstructure of the Foreign Exchange Market.” The
Journal of Finance, vol. 52, no. 4, 1997, pp. 1589–1614. JSTOR, JSTOR,
www.jstor.org/stable/2329448.
Westerhoff, Frank, (2009), Exchange Rate Dynamics: A Nonlinear Survey,
ch. 11 in , Handbook of Research on Complexity, Edward Elgar Publishing.
34
Frank Westerhoff, 2003. ”Market-maker, inventory control and foreign ex-
change dynamics,” Quantitative Finance, vol. 3(5), pages 363-369.
Mei Zhu, Carl Chiarella, Xue-Zhong He, Duo Wang,Does the market maker
stabilize the market?,Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applica-
tions,Volume 388, Issues 15–16,2009,Pages 3164-3180.
35
